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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND PART PERFORMANCE
OF LAND CONTRACTS IN KENTUCKY.
It is a well settled rule in Kentucky that a part per-
formance will not remove a contract for the sale of land from
operation of thbe Statute of Frauds. There is, however, an
equitable modification of this rule created by a long line of
judicial decisions founded on sound principles of equity as
applied to the facts of each particular case. These decisions
were born of the principle that since the Statute of Frauds
was created to prevent fraud it must never be allowed to be
used in the perpetration of a fraud. The general rule with
its equitable modification is clearly set out in the case of Crain
v. Crain et al.1 in which the court said:
"The rule is well established in this state that a verbal contract
for the sale or transfer of land is unenforceable and invalid. This
rule, however, is modified in cases where the grantee is placed in pos-
session of the land and while there bona fidely claiming and holding
the land as his, puts valuable permanent improvements thereon. In
such case the grantor cannot recover the land until he places the
grantee in status quo."
In the case of Usher's Exr. v. Flood2 U had reared F
and in consideration of valuable services rendered to hm by
F, promised to give F a house and lot. F went into posses-
sion. The court held that the parol gift did not entitle F to
the property but only to a lien thereon for the value of his
services and improvements.
It was held in Dean v. Cassidy3 that where one erected
improvements upon !he land of another under a verbal con-
tract between them, the Chancellor was correct in ordering a
sale of tbhe property at the instance of the party who erected
the improvements and in dividing the proceeds in the propor-
tion of the value of the lot and the improvements.
The case of Bobbitt v. James4 was very much like that of
Usher v. Flood, supra. M promised B that if he would come
to her home and care for her and her property during her
1 197 Ky. 813; 248 S. W. 176 (1922).
2 83 Ky. 552 (1884).
388 Ky. 572 (1888).
'148 Ky. 244 (1912).
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life she would give to him her farm. B complied with this
request. The court held that he was not entitled by this
verbal contract and performance to the land but could only
subject the land to a reasonable value for his services and
improvements.
Thus it is clear from these leading cases cited that Ken-
tucky, while refusing to allow a part performance to take a
contract out of the Statute of Frauds, does protect those who
so partly perform by requiring that they receive pecuniary
remuneration for whatever expense they incurred by acting on
the faith of the parol agreement.
Although this rule is contra to the weight of authority in
both this country and in England, it doubtlessly represents
the better view of the law.
That section of the Statute of Frauds relating to con-
tracts for the sale of land is as follows:
"No action shall be brought to charge any person . . . Sixthly,
upon any contract for the sale of real estate or any lease thereof for
longer term than one year, unless the promise, contract, agreement
etc., be in writing."
This statute does not render an oral contract for the sale of
land void but simply declares that no action shall be brought
upon such a contract. It was passed for the purpose of pre-
venting fraud by the perjuries that might creep into oral evi-
dence in these cases. It demands that there be written evidence
of a contract and that only written evidence will support an
action.
The courts in the majortiy of the states, in allowing part
performances to remove an oral contract from the Statute of
Frauds, seek to justify the formation of their exception to
the Statute by saying that there is another type of evidence
that is equally as good as written evidence. This is made up
of acts which they claim point unequivocally to a contract
for the sale of land. They say that if A goes into possession
of B's land and builds barns, fences, etc., he has performed
acts which point unequivocally to a contract to buy the land
and such part performance is held to exist as to take the oral
contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
This substitution is unsound. It is admitted that such
acts point to a contract but they do not point out unequivocally
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the terms and nature of the contract. They do not show
whether it was a lease for 5, 20 or 60 years or a contract to
convey a life estate or fee simple title. They may point to
one or the other but they do not show the exact contractual
relations of the parties. In order to ascertain these under the
majority rule the statutory safeguard against oral perjuries
must be let down. Part performance is a relative thng. Acts
which might constitute part performance of a lease for 5
years would not necessarily amount to part performance of a
contract to convey a fee simple title. It follows in every case
that before it can be ascertained whether or not the contract
has been in part performed the questions, Did the parties
agree? and What were the terms of the agreement? must be
answered by parol evidence. This, in the face of the require-
ment of the statute that these questions be answered only by
written evidence. 5  In the case of Grant's Heirs v. (Jraigmieso
the court said:
"Some judges have thought that another kind of evidence was
equivalent to written evidence, such as paying consideration, being let
into possession, making valuable improvements, etc.. . . The same
fraud and perjury which can conceive and prove the agreement by parol
can also prove the performance in part; but where the law is known,
the party who fails to get the land agreed for because he Is without the
evidence required must take the blame on himself, for it is his own
folly or negligence that has made him part with his money in expecta-
tion of the land, or, e converso, the possession of the land in ex-
pectation of the price, without the requisite evidence and In the very
teeth of the statute."
Kentucky, in refusing to adopt the majority rule has clung
to a sound and unassailable view of the law. The equitable
modification of the iron-clad rule of this jurisdiction is based
upon the soundest of legal principles and reasoning. Follow-
ing the principle that the Statute of Frauds must not be used
as a means to accomplish an injustice, the courts have con-
sistently held that the statute did not make an oral contract
void but only said that no action could be maintained on it;
that there was a good contract existing between the parties
the only defect being that no suit could be brought upon it;
that this contract would be used as a shield to prevent the
perpetration of a fraud. Hence on the strength of this oral
5Holtzclaw v. Blac1erby, 9 Bush 40 (1872).
61 Bibb. 205 (1808).
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contract it was sound law to require the vendor of the land
to place the vendee in status quo as a condition precedent to
his recovery of the land.
It is submitted that both as a matter of policy and of
legal interpretation, Kentucky's view is the more desirable.
Though the majority rule may offer a convenience in a par-
ticular case, at the same time it opens the door to other frauds
and injuries in that the same perjuries may be used to prove
the part performance that are used to prove the oral contract.
Hence the possibility of fraud is increased rather than de-
creased. On the other hand, Kentucky, while clinging to the
true letter of the law, yet applies the balm of equity to the
injuries of the oral contractor. Though he is by his own folly
and negligence deprived of an expectancy, he is placed in
status quo insofar as is practically possible by pecuniary
compensation.
H. R. WMHOIT.
